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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents an issue of first impression for this Court's consideration.
Article I, § 8 of the Idaho Constitution allows for felony prosecutions to begin only upon
either the filing of lnformation of the prosecutor or lndictment of a grand jury; however, if
a grand jury has "ignored" a charge, a defendant may not be held to answer upon an
lnformation of the prosecutor. The record in this case indicates that the State filed a
criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Pierce had committed the crime of sexual abuse of a
child under sixteen and, after a preliminary hearing, an lnformation was filed charging
Mr. Pierce with this crime. Mr. Pierce pled guilty and, during the sentencing hearing, the
prosecutor stated that a grand jury proceeding had been held in this case. Mr. Pierce,
through motions filed with this Court during the appellate process, sought additional
evidence of the grand jury proceedings in this case and whether the grand jury ignored
the charge. The record now shows that three grand jury proceedings occurred during
the approximate time period that Mr. Pierce's case would have been presented, but this
Court has denied Mr. Pierce the ability to discover whether any of those proceedings
involved his case.
Based upon the admission of the prosecutor that a grand jury reviewed
Mr. Pierce's case, an admission that has not been disproved by the record, and based
upon the fact that no lndictment was issued, Mr. Pierce asserts that his right to be free
from prosecution upon lnformation of the prosecutor, after a grand jury ignored the
charge, was violated. He further asserts, as an issue of first impression, that the plain

language of Article I, $j8 in effect limits when a court has subject-matter jurisdiction and
that a violation of this Constitutional provision can be raised for the first time on appeal.
Because the district court lacked jurisdiction, Mr. Pierce's conviction must be vacated.
Alternatively, Mr. Pierce asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking
his probation or by failing to reduce his sentence, upon his admission to probation
violations
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas -Trial Court
Based upon an allegation that on March 6, 2006, he had pulled down the
underwear of a four-year-old girl, Louis Pierce was arrested. (Presentence Investigation
Report, (hereinafterPSI), 9/14/06, p.2.) The next day, the State filed a Complaint in
Ada County case number M0603051 alleging that Mr. Pierce had committed the crime
of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years, by having "sexual contact"
with four year old M.B. by pulling down her underwear, so that he could see her
genitals.

(Augment: Complaint (M06003051).)'

Mr. Pierce was arraigned on the

charges and a preliminary hearing was set. (Augment: Ada County Magistrate Minutes,
March 7, 2006 (M06003051).)

However, on March 20, 2006, the date set for hearing,

the prosecuting attorney, Jean Fisher, moved to dismiss the allegation - a motion
granted by the magistrate. (Augment: Ada County Magistrate Minutes, March 20, 2006;
Order of Release (M06003051).)

'

Mr. Pierce has filed a Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to Augment the Record
and Statement in Support Thereof asking this Court to reconsider the portion of a
previous ruling in which this Court denied Mr. Pierce's request to augment the record
t..;rh A,,m~rnnn+c frnm A d s h 8 1 n t wrace nt~mherM0603051. The motion to reconsider is

The next day, the State filed a Complaint in Ada County case number M0603728,
again alleging that Mr. Pierce had committed the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor on
March 6, 2006, naming M. B. as the alleged victim.

(R., pp.7-8.)

The charging

language contained in this Complaint is nearly identical to the language contained the
Complaint filed in M0603051 with the exception that the second Complaint contains an
added allegation that Mr. Pierce was over the age of eighteen when the alleged crime
occurred.

(Compare Augment: Complaint (M0603051) with R., pp.7-8.)

Shelley

Armstrong represented the prosecuting attorney's office during the Preliminary Hearing
in this case. (Exhibit: Tr., prelim.) The only exhibit offered during the preliminary
hearing was a written statement created by Mr. Pierce on the night of his arrest.
(Exhibit: Tr., prelim, p.13, L.11 - p.15, L.15.) Mr. Pierce was bound over to the district
court, and an Information was filed charging him with the above crime. (R., pp.13-21;
Exhibit: Tr., prelim.)
Mr. Pierce, without the benefit of a plea bargain, pled guilty as charged. (Tr.,
8/1/06, p.1, L . l

-

p.16, L.21.)

Again, Ms. Armstrong represented the prosecuting

attorney's office during the entry of plea hearing. (R., p.41; Tr., 8/1/06, p.?, L.l
L.21.)

- p.16,

On October 25, 2006, a sentencing hearing was held wherein Jean Fisher

represented the State. (R., pp.47-50; Tr., 10125106, p.17, L . l - p.48, L.20.) The district
court began the sentencing hearing by identifying the case, the parties, the purpose of
the hearing, and identified the materials to be included with the PSI. (Tr., 10/25/06,
p. 17, L. 1 - p. 18, L. 16.) The Court asked Ms. Fisher if she had adequate time to review
the materials and Ms. Fisher responded by stating, "I have, Your Honor. And what was
not included in those that I saw in Ms. Armstrong's file are two photographs of the

children in question. I would like to include those for purposes of the pre-sentence
investigation. These were shown to the grand jury as well." (Tr., 10125/06, p.18,
Ls.14-23 (emphasis added).)
Ultimately, the district court sentenced Mr. Pierce to a unified term of fifteen
years, with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction in order for Mr. Pierce to participate
in the rider program. (R., pp.51-54.) Mr. Pierce successfully completed his rider and
was placed on probation for a period of fourteen years. (R., pp.58-71.) About seven
months later, the State filed a motion for probation violation. (R., pp.78-81.) Mr. Pierce
admitted to violating his probation by failing to pay his supervision fees, failing to
complete sex offender treatment and by frequenting places where minors or victims of
choice congregate. (Tr., 12/13/07, p.10, L.21 - p.1I,L.20.) The district court revoked
Mr. Pierce's probation and executed his underlying sentence.

( R pp.89-91.)

Mr. Pierce filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Order of Revocation of Probation,
Imposition of Sentence and Commitment. (R., pp.92-94.)
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinss -Appellate Court
Mr. Pierce filed a motion with this Court asking the Court to augment the record
with any transcript of grand jury proceedings, if they exist, concerning the allegation that
Mr. Pierce sexually abused M.B. on March 6, 2006, which would likely have been held
sometime between March 7 and March 20, 2006. (See Motion to Augment and to
Suspend the Briefing Schedule Pending Revelation of Grand Jury Determination and
Statement in Support Thereof, filed October 14, 2006.) In the same motion, Mr. Pierce
requested that this Court augment the record with any document, if one exists,
'.$:--':--

-.-..A
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Mr. Pierce for his

alleged abuse of M.B. on March 6, 2006. Id. Alternatively, Mr. Pierce requested that if
no grand jury proceedings occurred, that this Court order the district court to enter a
written statement indicating such. Id.
In response, this Court entered an Order requiring that "the District Court Clerk
shall SEARCH THEIR RECORDS AND REPORT WHETHER ANY GRAND JURY
PROCEEDING WAS INITIATED as to Defendant Luis James Pierce and report
existence or non-existenceof the same" to the parties and the Court. (See Order Re:
Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule Pending Grand Jury
Determination, dated December 8, 2008.) In response to this Court's order the district
court filed, with this Court a written statement indicating the following:
The staff of the clerk's office was unable to locate any records regarding
grand jury proceedings involving the Defendant-Appellant nor any
information that such proceedings took place. The staff's search
indicated that records of three grand jury proceedings (Nos. 22, 23
and 24), which may have taken place during the approximate time
frame, were not received by the clerk's office. The clerk's staff was
unable to find any grand jury minutes, voting records, or other documents
showing that a grand jury declined to issue an indictment against the
Defendant-Appellant.
(See Response of the District Court Clerk to Order Re: Motion to Augment and to
Suspend the

Briefing Schedule

Pending Grand Jury

Determination, dated

December 12,2008 (emphasis added))
Thereafter, Mr. Pierce filed a second motion to augment in essence requesting
three things. (See Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And For
In Camera Review Of Grand Jury Proceedings And Statement And Affidavit In Support

Thereof, filed January 16, 2009.) First, Mr. Pierce requested that this Court augment
the record with documents filed in Ada County case number M0603051, the docket

number wherein the prosecutor originally filed, then dismissed the allegation of sexual
abuse against Mr. Pierce, and included copies of the documents with the motion. Id.
Second, Mr. Pierce requested that this Court order the creation of a transcript of the
March 20, 2006, scheduled preliminary hearing in Mr. Pierce's case wherein the court
minutes reflect the State dismissed the charge, but the minutes did not indicate a
reason for the dismissal or whether it was with prejudice. Id.
The third request Mr. Pierce made was that this Court order the Honorable
Darla S. Williamson, Administrative Judge for the Ada County District Court, or her
designee, to conduct an in camera review of all of the recordings occurring in grand jury
proceedings Nos. 22, 23, 24, as indicated in the clerk's response to this Court's Order
requiring the district court to review its file to see if any grand jury proceedings occurred
in Mr. Pierce's case and to inform the parties to this appeal whether such a proceeding
had occurred. Id. Mr. Pierce alternatively requested that if it was impossible for Judge
Williamson to review these proceedings that she provide a written statement indicating
the reason. Id. This alternative request was made because, as is indicated in the
affidavit of counsel attached to the motion, two district court personnel had stated,
respectively, that when a grand jury does not issue an indictment, no records are kept
by the district court, and that the Ada County prosecutor handling the proceedings
deletes the recordings of the proceedings.' Id. In response, the Court issued an order
simply denying Mr. Pierce's motion without providing any reason for doing so. (See

' Mr. Pierce understands that counsel's affidavit attached to the Motion to Augment and

to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and for In Camera Review of Grand Jury Proceedings
and Statement and Affidavit in Support Thereof, is not evidence on this appeal.
I I-...-..-+h;- ;nfnrm=tinn i= rnIn\,nnt tn consider the auestion of whether or not

Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Reset the Briefing Schedule, dated
February 17,2009.)~This Appellant's Brief follows.

ISSUES
1

Has Mr. Pierce's right to be free from trial by Information after a grand jury has
ignored a charge, protected by Article I 3 8 of the Idaho Constitution, been
violated requiring that his conviction be vacated as the district court did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction over the alleged crime?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion after Mr. Pierce admitted to violating his
probation by executing his original sentence under the facts and circumstances
of this case?

ARGUMENT
I.
Mr. Pierce's Right To Be Free From Trial Bv lnformation After A Grand Juw Has
lanored A Charae, Protected By Article I 5 8 Of The ldaho Constitution, Has Been
Violated Requirinq That His Conviction Be Vacated As The District Court Did Not Have
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over The Alleaed Crime
A.

Introduction
Article I, § 8 of the ldaho Constitution clearly and unequivocally states that if a

grand jury ignores a charge against a person, that person cannot be thereafter charged
for the same offense by lnformation. While no ldaho Court has so held, the clear and
unequivocal language of this Constitutional provision denies a court subject-matter
jurisdiction, normally conferred through a properly filed lnformation, when that
lnformation is filed upon a charge previously ignored by a grand jury. Based upon the
State's admission that a grand jury heard Mr. Pierce's case, and based upon the fact
that the grand jury did not Indict Mr. Pierce, he asserts that the lnformation filed by the
State did not confer subject-matter jurisdiction to the Court and as such, his conviction
stemming from that lnformation must be vacated.

6.

Article I, 5 8 Of The ldaho Constitution Both Grants And Limits A District Court's
Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction. A Court Has No Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction Over A
Case Where An lnformation Is Filed In Violation Of This Provision And The Issue
Can Be Raised For The First Time On Appeal
As will be argued more fully in section I(C) below, Mr. Pierce asserts that the

record in this case reveals that a grand jury heard his case and ignored the charge
against him despite the fact that there is no official document in the record indicating as
such. In order to determine the relevance of this factual determination, this Court must

first decide an issue of first impression -whether an lnformation filed after a grand jury
has ignored a charge, in violation of Article I, § 8 of the ldaho Constitution, is a legal
nullity and, thus, fails to confer subject-matter jurisdiction to a court. Mr. Pierce asserts
that an lnformation filed in such a manner is a legal nullity, the district court had no
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his case, and the issue can be raised for the first time
on appeal.
The Riahts Enumerated In Article I,6 8 Are Both Individual Rights And A
Limitation On State Power

1.

The right to be free from prosecution other than by Indictment of lnformation
enumerated in Article I, § 8 is not merely a limit on the State's power to prosecute - it is
also a right held by individuals. Article I of the ldaho Constitution is entitled "Declaration
of Rights." IDAHO
CONST.art. I. Generally, the subsections of this article enumerate
rights retained by individuals against State power. Article I, § ? states that "All men are
by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are enjoying
and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; pursuing
CONST.art. I, 3 1. The ideals articulated in this
happiness and securing safety." IDAHO
section echo ideals articulated during the founding of this nation.
Article I, 3 8 reads, in relevant part, as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any
grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on
information of the public prosecutor, after a commitment by a magistrate
... and provided further, that after a charge has been ignored by a grand
jury, no person shall be held to answer, or for trial therefore, upon
information of the public prosecutor.
IDAHO
CONST.art. I, § 8.
:-A:..:A..-I-

,+

By its plain language, this section reserves the right of

h- hair4 tn i n c \ h r m r

fnr felnnv offenses

- offenses which if proven would

allow the State to deprive individuals of their rights to life, liberty and property

- only

after a grand jury has issued an indictment (or presentment), or after a prosecutor has
filed an information upon a magistrate's commitment. Id. In other words, individuals
cannot be held to answer for a felony offense

unless a

grand jury has issued an

indictment or a prosecutor has filed an information. Id
This individual right to be free from prosecution except by lnformation, is
extended beyond the sole requirement of a commitment by a magistrate in situations
where a grand jury has ignored a charge. Id. In such a case, an individual may not be
held upon lnformation at all. Id. As a corollary, a prosecutor may not prosecute an
individual on an lnformation after a grand jury has ignored the charge. In other words,
individuals cannot be held to answer for a felony offense alleged in an lnformation

unless no prior grand jury has reviewed and ignored the charge.
2.

An lndictment Or lnformation Confers Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction To The
District Court

A criminal proceeding cannot be held against a defendant in a trial court unless
that court has both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over the defendant. State v.
Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227-28, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131-32 (2004). A trial court attains
personal jurisdiction over a defendant - meaning the court's ability to hold the particular
defendant to answer - when that defendant initially appears in court on a criminal
complaint or an arraignment after an Indictment as been issued. Id. (citations omitted.)
Subject-matter jurisdiction describes a court's power to hear and determine a
particular case. Id. (citations omitted). In a felony criminal context, the trial court's
subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred to the district court through the charging

document, i.e., an lndictment or lnformation. Id. (citations omitted); see also State v.
Jones, 140 ldaho 755, I 0 1 P.3d 699 (2004); State v. Quintero, 141 ldaho 619, 115 P.3d
710 (2005). Absent a properly filed lndictment or lnformation, a district court does not
have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
3.

Althouqh An lndictment Or lnformation May Be Filed, A Court's SubiectMatter Jurisdiction. Ostensiblv Conferred Bv The Filing Of The Document,
Mav Be Illusory

ldaho Criminal Rule 7 articulates the requirements of Indictments and
Informations. I.C.R. 7. Occasionally, an lndictment or lnformation will contain defects.
However, not all defects that may be contained in these charging documents deprive a
district court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

ldaho Criminal Rule 12(b) requires that

challenges to defects in the charging document, "other than it fails to show jurisdiction of
the court or to charge an offense," must be raised prior to trial. I.C.R. 12(b). Although a
document may be filed which is entitled "lndictment" or "lnformation," it may not actually
confer subject-matter jurisdiction to the district court.
a.

Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction Can Never Be Waived And An Appellate
Court Can Review Whether A Charqinq Document Properly
Conferred Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction For The First Time On
Appeal

The ldaho Supreme Court recognizes that while personal jurisdiction may be
either waived or submitted to by an individual's voluntary appearance in court, subjectmatter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Rogers, 140 ldaho at 227-28, 91 P.3d at 1127-28
(citations omitted). As such, even if a defendant in a criminal case does not challenge
the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction in the district court, an appellate court

nevertheless may determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists when the
question is raised for the first time on appeal. Id.
b.

Althourlh An Information Contains A Statement Of Territorial
Jurisdiction And The Applicable Code Section Is Cited, An
lnformation Filed After A Grand Juw Ignores A Charge Does Not
Confer Subiect-Matter Jurisdiction Upon A Court

In recent years, the ldaho Supreme Court has addressed challenges to the
charging document raised for the first time on appeal. In Jones, the ldaho Supreme
Court recognized that two challenges to a charging instrument can be raised: first,
whether the charging instrument complies with due process requirements, a challenge
that must be made during trial court proceedings; and, second, "whether an indictment
or information is legally sufficient for the purpose of imparting jurisdiction." Jones, 140
ldaho at 758, 101 P.3d at 702. In Quintero, decided the following year, the Court held
that when a charging document is challenged after the entry of judgment, the charging
document will be deemed to have conferred subject-matter jurisdiction upon the court
as long as it contains a statement of territorial jurisdiction and contains citation to the
applicable code section. State v. Quinfero, 141 ldaho 619, 622, 115 P.3d 710, 713
(2005) (citing Jones, 140 ldaho at 759, 101 P.3d at 703; I.C.R. 12(b). However, both
Jones and Quinfero dealt with a challenge to the sufficiency of the charging instrument
where the charging instrument omitted elements of the crime charged. See State v.
Quintero, 141 ldaho 619, 115 P.3d 710 (2005), generally; see also State v. Jones, 140
ldaho 755, 101 P.3d 699 (2004), generally. Mr. Pierce is unaware of any case wherein
an ldaho Supreme Court, in its majority opinion, has held that filing an Information after
a grand jury has ignored the charge, in violation of Article I, § 8, also deprives a court of

subject-matter jurisdiction. However, the plain reading of the constitutional provision as
well as other precedent from ldaho leads inevitably to the conclusion that such a
violation does deprive a court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
As noted above, Article I, § 8 reads:
No person shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any
grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on
information of the public prosecutor, after a commitment by a magistrate
... and provided further, that after a charge has been ignored by a
grand jury, no person shall be held to answer, or for trial therefore,
upon information of the public prosecutor.
ldaho Const. Art. I,

3

8 (emphasis added).

The language is plain, concise, and

unambiguous. "No" means "no" and, because the Indictment or lnformation confers
subject-matter jurisdiction upon the Court, an lnformation filed in violation of Article I,
§ 8's prohibition against filing an lnformation after a grand jury has ignored a charge, is

a nullity.
In Ex Parfe Winn, 28 ldaho 461, 154 P. 497,498 (1916), the petitioner filed a writ
of habeas corpus arguing that Article I, § 8 of the ldaho Constitution prevented the
petitioner from being tried upon an lnformation filed in that case when a grand jury had
ignored the charge. Id. However, in that case, the grand jury met affer the defendant
was charged by lnformation with the crime. Id. The Court noted, "A fatal defect in this
contention arises from the fact that, conceding the grand jury did ignore the charge,
petitioner had been theretofore, instead of thereafter, held to answer and for trial." Id.
Because the defendant had waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was held to
answer in the district court, "the court acquired jurisdiction of petitioner and of the
offense with which he was charged from which it could not be deprived by any action of

-
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" Id While the Court did not address what

its ruling would have been had the grand jury ignored the charge "theretofore" the
lnformation was filed, the Court recognized that jurisdiction was properly conferred to
the district court because the lnformation was not improperly filed.
In State v. Wilson, 41 ldaho 598, 242 P. 787 (1925), the defendant appealed the
district court's denial of his motion to quash and the exclusion of testimony from the
prosecutor and the foreman of the grand jury, which he asserted would have shown that
he was "acquitted" of the charge he was facing when the grand jury ignored the charge.

Id. 41 ldaho at -,

242 P.2d at 787-88. The ldaho Supreme Court held that the denial

of the defendant's motion to quash was not incorporated into a special bill of exceptions
and thus was not properly before the Court. Id. The Court then held that his special
plea, a statement that he had been "acquitted" of the charge after the grand jury ignored
the charge, was not properly made and, even if this were not so, the district court did
not err in excluding the proffered testimony because the failure of a grand jury to indict
was not an "acquittal" under a double jeopardy analysis. Id.
During the trial the appellant called the former prosecuting attorney and foreman
of the grand jury, they were not allowed to testify, and the appellant made an offer of
proof that, if allowed, they would testify that the grand jury previously ignored the charge
against him. Id. 41 ldaho at -,

242 P. at 789. The Court recognized that "Counsel

vigorously contends, however, that his offer raised a jurisdictional question of the
highest order." Id. However, the Court found that the evidence proffered was intended
to support a finding that his prosecution should be barred by operation of Article I, f3 8, a
determination beyond the province of the jury. Id.

Chief Justice Lee authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.4

Id. 141 Idaho at -,

242 P. at 790-92 (C.J. Lee, concurring and dissenting.) Chief

Justice Lee dissented because he believed that the "record on this appeal presents this
jurisdictional question and this court should decide it." Id. 41 ldaho a t , 242 P. at
790 (C.J. Lee, concurring and dissenting.) Chief Justice Lee cited to Article I, 5 8 of the
ldaho Constitution and continued:
There can be no question but what this constitutional provision intends to
bar and absolutely prohibit the public prosecutor from prosecuting one
accused of crime after the charge has been ignored by a grand jury. With
the wisdom of this organic act we are not concerned.

Id. Chief Justice Lee found, "If an information could not be filed, the alleged information
presented no question to the trial court that called its powers into action, except to
require it to deny jurisdiction and dismiss the proceedings." Id. 41 Idaho at -,

242 P.

at 791 (C.J. Lee, concurring and dissenting.). He concluded:
In the case at bar, the defendant was tried upon an information that is a
nullity, because neither the public prosecutor or any one else had the
power to make the charge, and hence no charge was made, and the
verdict of guilty and the judgment of conviction thereon are void.

Id. 41 Idaho a t , 242 P. at 792 (C.J. Lee, concurring and dissenting.)
Thus, while ldaho Court's have yet to specifically rule that an Information filed
after a grand jury has ignored a charge is a nullity and does not confer subject-matter
jurisdiction to the Court, the plain reading of the Constitutional provision and the
authorities cited above should lead this Court to hold as such

Due to the death of Chief Justice Dunn prior to the case being fully briefed and
lltftirn I PP a~~thnred
both a aortion of the majority opinion and a separate

d--id-d

4.

Because Mr. Pierce Claims That The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction To Hear His Case Based Upon The lnformation Filed After
The Grand Jury lqnored His Case. His Claim Is Ripe For Appellate Review

As noted above, a question of subject matter can be reviewed for the first time on
appeal. State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 101 P.3d 699 (2004). Mr. Pierce asserts that
the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction due to the Information being
filed after the grand jury ignored the charge against him. As such, his claim is ripe for
appellate review.
C.

A Grand Jury lqnored The Charge Aaainst Mr. Pierce
No document exists in the record unquestionably showing that a grand jury heard

and ignored the charged against Mr. Pierce. Mr. Pierce recognizes that "jilt is well
established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ...and where
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the
actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 ldaho 29, 34,981 P.2d 754, 759 (Ct. App.
1999) (citation omitted). Thus, he anticipates the State may argue that he has not
supported his claim that a grand jury ignored the charge against him. However, based
upon the State's unequivocal statement made in the district court that a grand jury was
shown pictures of the alleged victim and her sister, the fact that an lnformation was
eventually filed after the original complaint had been dismissed, the fact that three grand
jury proceedings occurred during the possible time-frame a grand jury would have heard
his case for which nothing was submitted to the district court, and the fact that there is
no criminal rule articulating a procedure when a grand jury ignores a charge, Mr. Pierce

asserts that the record in his case shows that a grand jury did in fact hear and ignore
the charge.
1.

The State Admitted That A Grand Jury Reviewed The Case

During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated, "what was not included in
[the presentence materials] that I saw in Ms. Armstrong's file are two photographs of the
children in question. I would like to include those for purposes of the pre-sentence
investigation. These were shown to the grand jury as well." (Tr., 10/25/06, p.18,
Ls.17-23 (emphasis added).) This statement is clear and unambiguous. There was no
equivocal language such as "I believe" or "it is my understanding." The prosecutor
acknowledged that a grand jury was convened.
The photos in question were not presented to the magistrate during the
preliminary hearing. The only exhibit offered during the preliminary hearing was a
written statement created by Mr. Pierce on the night of his arrest. (Exhibit: Tr., prelim,
p.13, L.11 - p.15, L.15.) It strains reason to conclude that the prosecutor simply meant
to say "to the magistrate" or "during the preliminary hearing" rather than "to the grand
jury" when the two photos were, in fact, not presented during to the magistrate during
the preliminary hearing. While the prosecutor making a simple mistake cannot be ruled
out, to believe such is to believe that the prosecutor was

unaware that the hearing

from which the charging document stemmed was secret and in front of sixteen citizens,
outside the presence of the defendant, rather than open to the public, in front of one
judge, in the presence of Mr. Pierce and his counsel,

and that

the prosecutor was

merely mistaken in her belief that the photos were presented to whatever body was
asked to determine if probable cause existed sufficient to formally charge the defendant.

Furthermore, the very relevance that the prosecutor offered to support her
request to show the photos to the district court and to be included in the PSI materials,
was that they were previously viewed by a probable cause finder. There is no reason to
believe that the prosecutor would intentionally mislead the district court in order to
convince the court to place the photos with the presentence materials. The most logical
conclusion is that the prosecutor made the statements because, in fact, the photos were
presented to the grand jury.
2.

Three Grand Juw Proceedings May Have Occurred Durina The
Approximate Time Frame That A Grand Jury Would Have Heard
Mr. Pierce's Case And No Criminal Rule Directs A Grand Jury On What
To Do When it Ignores A Charae

In response to an Order from this Court, the district court filed a written statement
indicating the following:
The staff of the clerk's office was unable to locate any records regarding
grand jury proceedings involving the Defendant-Appellant nor any
information that such proceedings took place. The staff's search
indicated that records of three grand jury proceedings (Nos. 22, 23
and 24), which may have taken place during the approximate time
frame, were not received by the clerk's office. The clerk's staff was
unable to find any grand jury minutes, voting records, or other documents
showing that a grand jury declined to issue an indictment against the
Defendant-Appellant.
(See Response of the District Court Clerk to Order Re: Motion to Augment and to
Suspend the

Briefing Schedule

Pending Grand Jury

Determination, dated

December 12, 2008) (emphasis added). The most obvious question is how could there
have been grand jury proceedings in March of 2006, and the district court have no
record of those proceedings in December of 2008? While the record in this case does

not reveal a definitive reason why,5 the lack of a criminal rule stating exactly how such
records are to be kept may provide an answer.
ldaho Criminal Rules 6.1 through 6.9 govern the procedures attendant to the
grand jury process.

Rule 6.4 enumerates the secrecy involved in grand jury

proceedings. I.C.R. 6.4. The only people allowed to be present are the grand jurors,
the prosecuting attorney, a witness present for questioning, the person designated to
report the proceedings, and any needed interpreters. I.C.R. 6.4(a). The district court
judge is only allowed to be present, after the grand jury has been empanelled, if
requested by the grand jury. Id. These proceedings, while secret, are supposed to be
recorded either stenographically or electronically. I.C.R. 6.3(a). The recordings of the
proceedings are supposed to be sealed by the clerk of the court and are only available
for review, by order of the district court, by the prosecutor, the defendant or his counsel,
or a person charged with perjury stemming from his testimony in front of the grand jury.
I.C.R. 6.3(b)-(c).

In Mr. Pierce's Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And For In
Camera Review Of Grand Jury Proceedings And Statement And Affidavit In Support
Thereof, filed January 16, 2009, undersigned counsel included his own affidavit
acknowledging that he had spoken with two Ada County deputy clerks who informed
him, respectively, that it was their understanding that any time a grand jury is
empanelled and fails to indict, the prosecutor does not file any documentation indicating
as such with the district court and destroys the audio recordings of the proceedings. If
this is true, it is truly disturbing. Arguably a prosecutor who engages such behavior is
withholding or destroying evidence that may be both exculpatory, mitigating and
potentially impeaching. See Brady v. Maryland, 376 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Furthermore,
such behavior would enable a prosecutor to violate a defendant's Article I, § 8 rights in
the hope that a defendant would never find out - a violation difficult to discover due to
the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in general. Such behavior would be frowned
upon by the ldaho Rules of Professional Conduct and would be repugnant to the basic
ideal at the very foundation of this Nation
that a person may not have their life, liberty, or
..

When 12 grand jurors find probable cause sufficient to issue an indictment, the
presiding grand juror must return the indictment to the district court.

I.C.R. 6.6(c).

Furthermore, the presiding grand jury is required to prepare a list of all jurors voting in
favor of, and against, an indictment, a list that must be sealed but can be disclosed to
the prosecutor, defendant and defense counsel, by order of the court. I.C.R. 6.6(d).
This later rule appears to apply only when a grand jury has issued an indictment as,
absent an indictment, there would likely be no defendant and no defense counsel.
Furthermore, Rule 6.7(b) allows a defendant who has been indicted to challenge
individual jurors provided that, if twelve or more qualified grand jurors concurred in
finding an indictment, dismissal of the indictment is not warranted. I.C.R. 6.7(b). Thus,
the voting list required under I.C.R. 6.6(d) appears to serve the purpose of a challenge
under Rule 6.7(b).
In any event, there is no criminal rule that specifically states what a grand jury is
to do when they "ignore" a charge. Idaho Code § 19-1402 states that if a grand jury
fails to indict a defendant, "the depositions, if any, transmitted to them must be returned
to the court, with an indorsement thereon, signed by the foreman, to the effect that the
charge is dismissed." I.C. § 19-1402. While this requirement states what procedure
should be used when a grand jury fails to indict, there is no criminal rule that gives effect
to this statute. Without a criminal rule giving effect to § 19-1402, and without any other
document informing the grand jury, and prosecutors, what to do when a grand jury
ignores a charge, the absence of evidence documenting that the grand jury ignore the
charge, is not evidence of absence.

In sum, the prosecutor stated that the grand jury reviewed Mr. Pierce's case. No
grand jury Indictment was filed. Three grand jury proceedings may have occurred
during the time period in which Mr. Pierce's case would have been pending, but there
are no records as to what those grand jury proceedings dealt with. The absence of
documentation showing that the grand jury ignored the charge is not dispositive of
whether the grand jury heard the case based upon the secrecy of the grand jury
proceedings, the role of gatekeeper employed by the prosecutor, and the lack of a
criminal rule instructing the grand jury on what to do when it ignores a charge,
Mr. Pierce asserts that the record in this case leads inextricably to the conclusion that a
grand jury was empanelled, heard the allegations against him, and ignored the charge.
D.

Because The Grand Jury lanored The Charae Aaainst Mr. Pierce, The District
Court Had No Subject-Matter Jurisdiction To Hear His Case And His Conviction
Must Be Vacated
Because a grand jury ignored the charge against him, the Information filed by the

prosecutor was a legal nullity due to the clear and unequivocal requirements of Article I,
§ 8 of the Idaho Constitution, and the district court did not have subject-matter

jurisdiction over Mr. Pierce's case. As such, this Court must vacate his conviction.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion After Mr. Pierce Admitted To Violating His
Probation Bv Executing His Oriainal Sentence Under The Facts And Circumstances Of
This Case
A.

Introduction
Mr. Pierce asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its

discretion by executing the original sentence upon Mr. Pierce admitting to violating the

terms of his probation. He asserts that his unified sentence of fifteen years, with five
years fixed, is excessive considering the nature of his criminal act and his actions since
that time. The district court abused its discretion by failing to continue Mr. Pierce on
probation, failing to grant Mr. Pierce an opportunity at a second rider, or failing to reduce
his sentence.

8.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion After Mr. Pierce Admitted To Violating
His Probation BV Executing His Original Sentence Under The Facts And
Circumstances Of This Case
In proceedings stemming from alleged probation violations, the district court must.

decide three issues: whether a condition of probation was violated; if so, whether
probation should be revoked or continued; and, if probation is revoked, what prison
sentence should be ordered. State v. Adams, 115 ldaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260,
261 (Ct. App. 1989). In the present case, Mr. Pierce does not challenge the finding that
he violated the terms of his probation as he admitted that he had done so. When an
appellate Court reviews a sentence ordered into execution after probation has been
revoked, the Court reviews the entire record including events before and after the
original judgment was entered. Id. at 1055, 772 P.2d at 262.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court executed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 ldaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183
(Ct. App. 1982). The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[wlhere a sentence is within
statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 294,

939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 ldaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71,
75 (1979)). In order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Pierce must show that in light
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. (citing Sfafe v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 ldaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992)). The
governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society;
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v.
Wolfe, 99 ldaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978)).
The district court had four options available to it during the disposition hearing:
the court could have retained Mr. Pierce on probation applying some form of alternate
sanction; pursuant to ldaho Code § 19-2601(4), the court could have retained
jurisdiction for a second time over Mr. Pierce; pursuant to ldaho Criminal Rule 35, the
district court could have executed a reduced sentence; or, the court could have
executed the original sentence. Viewing all of the facts and circumstances in this case,
the district court abused its discretion by executing the original sentence and not
exercising one of the three lesser alternatives.
Initially, it should be recognized that the nature of Mr. Pierce's offense, while
certainly criminal and deserving of punishment, was not severe. Mr. Pierce was a
neighbor of the four-year-old girl and her five-year-old sister and he admitted to pulling
down the four year-old's underwear and looking at her genitals. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.2.)
The four-year old told CARES personnel that no one has touched her "pee-pee" or her
"butt."

(PSI, 9/14/06: BPD Supplemental Report (Stephenson), 3/22/06).

While

perhaps not mitigating, the evidence showing that Mr. Pierce did nothing more than look
at the child's genitals shows that the nature of the crime was certainly not severe.
In exchange for nothing, Mr. Pierce agreed to plead guilty. (Tr., 8/1/06, p.1, L.l p.2, L.25.) The State's only assurance was that they would take into account the results
of any psychosexual evaluation and the information contained in the PSI but they were
not bound to make any

recommendation^.^

(Tr., 8/1/06, p.1, L.l

- p.2,

L.25.) The

district court signed an order requiring Ada County to pay for Dr. John Morgan to
conduct the psychosexual evaluation (R., pp.37-38); however, apparently based upon a
proposed order submitted by the State (R., pp.42-43), the district court entered an Order
Withdrawing Order for Evaluation by Dr. Morgan erroneously stating that the plea
agreement required that an evaluation would be done by a SANE evaluator (R., pp.4445.)

Nevertheless, the State's chosen evaluator, Dr. Robert Engle, concluded that

Mr. Pierce is a

low risk to re-offend and is an appropriate candidate for outpatient sex

offender treatment. (Psychosexual Eval, pp.9, 11.)
Mr. Pierce was 23 years old at the time of his original sentencing. (PSI, 9/14/06,
p.1.) Mr. Pierce's biggest problem is his alcoholism. He started drinking around the
age of 13 and as he got older he drank more and more. (PSI, 9/14/06, pp.13-14.) As
early as age 16, Mr. Pierce was drinking every other day or so. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.13.)
Mr. Pierce's father was also an alcoholic and on one occasion, Mr. Pierce heard his
father choking his mother, he punched his father, and his father left. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.6.)
The unintended consequence of his father leaving was that he then had the whole

This appears to be a recitation of a prosecutor's responsibilities in any sentencing
hearing.

house to himself and could party whenever he wanted. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.6.) By the time
he went to jail pending resolution of the charges, he was using so much alcohol that he
suffered serious withdrawal symptoms. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.14.) On the night of his crime,
he drank "'a half bottle of Black Velvet Whiskey."' (PSI, 9/14/06, p.14.) Mr. Pierce has
also used methamphetamine and marijuana in the past.

(PSI, 9/14/06, p.14.)

Mr. Pierce's mother expressed her supporter for her son and noted that alcohol is his
problem.

(PSI, 9/14/06, pp.7-8.)

Mr. Pierce recognized that he needed alcohol

treatment and expressed a desire to partake in such treatment. (PSI, 9/14/06, p.14.)
Despite Dr. Engle's conclusions, during the sentencing hearing the State
recommended that Mr. Pierce be sent to prison for a period of fifteen years, with two
years fixed. (Tr., 10/25/06, p.20, L.22 - p.29, L.7.) Counsel for Mr. Pierce asked that
he be placed on probation. (Tr., 10/25/06, p.39, Ls.74-17.) The district court imposed
and executed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, but retained
jurisdiction so that Mr. Pierce could participate in a rider. (R., pp.51-54.)
At the conclusion of his rider, the Department of Correction recommended that
he be placed on probation. (APSI.) Mr. Pierce wrote a letter to the court indicated that
his participation in the Sex Offender Assessment Group made him realize that his
actions hurt M.B. and her family and he wished for a chance to make amends. (APSI:
Letter from Mr. Pierce.) Despite the recommendations from the IDOC, the prosecutor
recommended that the court relinquish jurisdiction because, in the prosecutor's mind,
the DOC recommendation of probation was a "conclusion completely in error." (Tr.,
4/5/07, p.56, Ls.19-22.) The district court ultimately placed Mr. Pierce on probation for a
period of fourteen years. (R., pp.58-71.)

Mr. Pierce admitted to violating his probation by failing to pay his supervision
fees, failing to complete sex offender treatment and by frequenting places where minors
or victims of choice congregate. (Tr., 12/13/07, p.10, L.21 - p.11, L.20.) Notably, he
had not engaged in any criminal activity, had not consumed any alcohol or controlled
substances, and most importantly, he had not re-offended. (See PSI, 1/25/08, p.2;
Attachment, Report of Probation Violation.) In fact, Mr. Pierce completed a polygraph
examination where he was asked if he had any sexual contact other than with the two
adult women he admitted to having contact with (including the mother of one of his
children), Mr. Pierce stated that he had not and the examiner noted that his reactions
were consistent with truthfulness. (PSI, 1/25/08 Attachment, Confidential Polygraph
Report.)
During the disposition hearing, the State for the third time asked that Mr. Pierce
be sent to prison. (Tr., 2/8/08, p.88, Ls.14-15.) Counsel for Mr. Pierce asked that he
either be retained on probation or sent on a second rider. (Tr., 2/8/08, p.88, L.18 p.91, L.2.) Counsel noted to the court that Mr. Pierce has the strong support of his
family and that he because he took the Sex Offender Assessment Group while on his
first rider, he did not take other programming that would address other areas of concern
such as his thinking errors. (Tr., 2/8/08, p.88, L.18 - p.93, L.4.) The district court then
revoked Mr. Pierce's probation and did not reduce his sentence. (R., pp.89-91.)
Mr. Pierce is currently serving a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years
fixed, after he admitted to pulling down a four-year old girl's underwear when he was
drunk. Already a low risk to re-offend, between the time he made that poor decision
and the time the district court executed his sentence, he had learned how his actions

had harmed the child and her family, had stopped drinking, and had not committed any
new criminal offenses, specifically, he had not committed any new sex offenses. The
ldaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice,
103 ldaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982). In Nice, the ldaho Supreme Court reduced a
sentence based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not
give proper consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in
causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the
problem." Id. at 91, 645 P.2d at 325. Furthermore, the ldaho Supreme Court has ruled
that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 ldaho
405,408,631 P.2d 187, 190 (1981).
Additionally, Mr. Pierce has the strong support of his family members and friends.
(PSI, p.6.) See State v. Shideler, 103 ldaho 593, 594-595, 651 P.2d 527, 528-29 (1982)
(reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his family and employer in his
rehabilitation efforts). He was 23 year old at the time of this offense and ldaho Courts
recognize that the young age of a defendant should be taken into consideration as a
mitigating factor. See State v. Dunnagan, 101 ldaho 125, 126, 609 P.2d 657, 658
(1980).
Considering the nature of the offense and character of the offender, the district
court abused its discretion by failing to continue probation, send Mr. Pierce on a second
rider, or reduce his sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Pierce respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction due to the
district court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, he respectfully requests
that this Court remand his case to the district court with instructions that he be placed
on probation or that the district court retain jurisdiction or otherwise reduce Mr. Pierce's
sentence as this Court deems appropriate.
DATED this 3othday of March, 2009.
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